

Italy. Essentially, with regard to finance, these firms took a back seat to large enterprises. However, useful links were made with agents and suppliers and technical assistance programmes. The final essay on Italy, by Valerio Varini, considers the impact of the Marshall Plan on Italian industry through the technique of focusing on one of Italy's main 'industrial nodes' (p. 110), Sesto Giovanni. He argues that, generally, the contribution of the Marshall Plan to productivity in Italy was most important in facilitating the purchase or acquisition of raw materials and goods—with much less emphasis on business management systems or on aspects of organisation or human relations. It demonstrably quickened growth in productivity.

The impact of the Marshall Plan on French industries is analysed by Dominique Barjot and Emmanuel Dreyfus. They argue that 'it was not a departure point' but, rather, 'it fits into a continuity' (p. 162), which it facilitated by allowing improvements in the financing of investments. They emphasise also the important role played by productivity missions to the US of businessmen, young engineers, civil servants and trade unionists, although those sent by firms were more important than the official missions. The whole Marshall Plan represented an essential step in a larger movement of technological and economic organisation and, they conclude, it 'contributed without a doubt to the acceleration of French industrial growth in the 1950s and 1960s' (p. 163).

This is in sharp contrast to the experience of the US. According to Jacqueline McGlade, in her essay on American aims and European re-industrialisation, from the beginning American trade protectionists clashed with liberal free-traders over the Plan's attempt to modernise and expand European commercial and industrial sectors. Things were complicated by the deepening of the Cold War, because military security and containment were at odds with economic liberalisation, and American firms suffered rather more than their European counterparts from the restrictions imposed on trade with the USSR and its allies and satellites. By the end of the Cold War, US business had lost its previous international dominance.

The book provides a mixture of approaches, from the detailed exegeses of the Italian chapters to the broader arguments of the others, in particular that of McGlade. For the European economic historian in particular, this could be a useful book.

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*Le choix de la CEE par la France: L'Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle (1955–1969)*, by Laurent Warlouzet (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011; pp. 569. €40).

High stakes and hyperbole have often obscured the fact that what we know today as the European Union was born out of a messy compromise. It was the product of competing interests and overlapping visions, all of which jostled for space among Europe's technocratic elite of the 1950s. In these early years, France played a vital role. Its national pride may have been badly wounded

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by the experience of the Second World War, the coming of the Cold War and protracted colonial conflict, but if there was one area where the French could still wield their influence, it was over their European neighbours. There was initial hostility in many circles but French negotiators, politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders soon saw the opportunity for a European project that would further their own ends.

What exactly these ends were—and how they mattered—is the subject of Laurent Warlouzet's meticulous analysis of France's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). With the help of painstaking and comprehensive archival research, he makes clear just how little the French were able to control the slow process of European unification in the late 1950s and '60s—and how contingent the grand ideals of the European project actually were. The approach is predominantly chronological, moving from the debates surrounding projects for economic union in the mid-1950s to the end of Charles de Gaulle's presidency in 1969. The originality of the book's thesis undoubtedly lies in its emphasis on how far behind the French were in adapting to emerging European priorities. While some administrators—such as the influential Robert Marjolin—saw potential, many others feared economic competition and a relative decline in French geopolitical power. In large part, this was because the Algerian War and the collapse of the Fourth Republic severely compromised institutional and ideological consensus. Indeed, the author does not stress enough that a whole-hearted commitment to Europe was only possible once the Algerian question was settled. Quite apart from the financial and political toll of the war, Algeria raised too many intractable questions with respect to France's identity in Europe—a subject that scholars such as Todd Shepard have begun to address.

If the colonial question is left a little too far in the background, there can be no complaints about Warlouzet's reconstruction of the world of France's technocratic elite. He is especially strong on the links that bound this elite together. He assiduously disentangles networks of *haut fonctionnaires* (civil servants), politicians and business leaders, and gives a careful assessment of their importance in the decision-making process. In this sense, his book is a contribution to a growing debate about the political thought and engagement of France's apparently 'apolitical' post-war elites—work which has been pioneered by scholars such as Richard Kuisel, Richard Vinen and Philip Nord. Warlouzet demonstrates that, by the early 1960s, there were three European 'models' available to the French. The first was most strongly associated with the German 'ordo-liberal' school and aimed to create a neo-liberal free market; the second stressed the need for economic and monetary union—a model championed by Marjolin; and the third was the openly 'federalist' vision of figures such as Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European Commission. For much of the 1960s, these three models competed to become the blueprint for Europe, and we gain a real insight into how less-well-known actors—such as France's business leaders—succeeded in defining the contours of the debate.

This welcome attempt to bring hitherto invisible actors into the historiography of European politics also modifies our view of de Gaulle. Warlouzet's striking claim—that the French president was little more than a 'père involontaire de l'Europe'—undermines a traditional myth that the French president created the EEC in his image. On the contrary, Warlouzet argues that de Gaulle did not see the benefits of French participation until well

into his presidency. His exclusion of Britain in 1963 and 1967 and the Empty Chair Crisis in 1965 were signs of his obdurate, backward-looking attitude. Of course, such an interpretation would have been familiar to any British negotiator struggling to deal with de Gaulle's intransigence in the 1960s, but here it is given careful historical contextualisation. The result is a valuable corrective to hagiographical accounts of de Gaulle's role and a more nuanced understanding of how and why France embraced its European 'destiny'.

Unfortunately, Warlouzet's book, which rests on such a rich source base, is let down by its schematic presentation. Put simply, this is not an easy book to read. The author has cut his doctoral thesis in half but, at well over 500 pages, it is still a long and unwieldy book—something which is not helped by its rather stodgy prose. Anyone familiar with French academic writing will recognise the plethora of sub-sections and frequent repetitions of the key points; perhaps it would be churlish to pass judgement when these are the scholarly conventions of the field in France. Nevertheless, the form limits the content. One of the most convincing sections is the reassessment of de Gaulle, which is clearly presented and elegantly argued, but there are too many interpretative perspectives that are mentioned in the conclusion and left undeveloped. This reader would have liked to see greater reflection on the changing character of the French elites, some discussion of what went into creating the transnational administrator class that had such an impact on the elaboration of the European project, or even a comparative dimension that would have helped us situate the French experience more clearly in relation to those of its European partners. One can only hope that these are perspectives that the author will develop in future journal articles. Until then, this book will remain valuable because of the excellent archival work and the complete bibliography, but interested readers will find a work such as Michael Sutton's *France and the Construction of Europe* (2007) far more accessible.

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*Modern Motherhood: Women and Family in England, 1945–2000*, by Angela Davis (Manchester: Manchester U.P., 2012; pp. 272. £65).

At the heart of Angela Davis's *Modern Motherhood* are the lives of 166 women, the mothers interviewed for the author's doctoral and post-doctoral research into women's changing life experiences over the second half of the twentieth century. Their personal narratives are to be found throughout the book, and by carefully interweaving quotations from her interviewees with analysis of the themes of 'women's lives, gender relations, culture and society, family and community patterns, health and welfare, and the relationship between the family and state' Davis has written an important study (p. 1). Her book focuses on a diverse group of women from Oxfordshire, yet also has much to contribute to wider histories of women's lives, attitudes and identities in a period of substantial change.

Taking a thematic approach, the book examines women's life-course set against the backdrop of cultural ideals around parenting and individual relationships found within the immediate and extended family. In her second

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