A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"
The Harkis' Exile at the Rivesaltes Camp (1962–1964)

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> A community of destinies, the suffering of internees, solidarity in action.
>
> Do not forget…
>
> A plain located between ponds and mountains a few kilometers from Perpignan along the highway. These barracks, these vestiges, these pieces of barbed wire, for how long have they been there and for how much longer will they be there?
>
> A place where the fates of children, women and men intertwined during tragic events… the Rivesaltes camp is a survivor of the dark years of the twentieth century…*[1]
>
> - Rivesaltes Memorial Website

The Rivesaltes camp, also known as the Joffre camp, is located on a vast plot measuring four by two kilometers in rural French Catalonia. The camp takes its name from one of Rivesaltes' most famous natives, Maréchal Joseph Joffre, First World War general and member of the Académie française, born in a house that once stood on the land. Its southernmost border sits five kilometers north of the Rivesaltes town hall and thirteen kilometers north of downtown Perpignan. Fifteen kilometers eastward lies the Mediterranean Sea, the passageway to France's former colony of Algeria. Vineyards with Muscat grapes, the local specialty, skirt the camp's periphery. Today, all that remain of the camp are the crumbling cement and wood shells of eighty-square-meter barracks, hollow outhouses with Turkish-style toilets, scattered pieces of barbed wire intertwined with weeds, and a dilapidated sign bearing "C mp J ffre de Rivesaltes."

Three months after the Third Republic government had opened the first of the two hundred internment camps for so-called "undesirable foreigners,"

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refugees, and prisoners that dotted the French countryside during the "Dark Years," it inaugurated Rivesaltes in May 1939.[2] Like the thousands of camps that appeared across the globe during what historian Denis Peschanski labels "the century of camps," by definition this space would separate and distance its inhabitants from the rest of society.[3] Divided into military and civilian sections, Rivesaltes was unique for how long it remained open and the diversity of populations that it housed, communities with "intertwined fates" according to the quotation from the Rivesaltes Memorial project's website cited above. The camp's initial mission was to billet colonial troops awaiting assignment during the Second World War, yet its principal vocation quickly shifted as the events of the war induced an international refugee crisis.[4] From 1940 to 1942 the military section of the Rivesaltes camp primarily served as a training facility for groups of refugees (Compagnies de travailleurs étrangers) who filled jobs vacated by metropolitan workers enlisted in the French Army. In a March 1939 letter, the Ministries of Interior and Labor offered the following rationale for their creation: "to transform this disorganized and passive mass of refugees into useful components for the nation."[5] In January 1941 the government opened a civilian section to house refugees fleeing Francoist Spain, Hungarian gypsies, French suspected of having links with Communists and anarchists, and Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazi regime in Eastern Europe. To keep order over the internees, the government established a network of state agents, including policemen and teachers.[6] A portion of the camp simultaneously interned French Jews rounded up in summer 1942.[7] Historian Serge Klarsfeld attributed to the camp the title "Drancy of the Free Zone," a weighty descriptor given that Drancy was the major transit point in France for the Auschwitz extermination camp. After France's Liberation, the camp incarcerated German and Italian prisoners of war and three thousand presumed Vichy collaborators.[8] Soon after the Second World War the camp lay largely unutilized, except as a military training center and a way station for troops heading to Algeria for this war of decolonization (1954 to 1962). From 9 March 1962 to 18 April 1962, a small portion imprisoned 487 National Liberation Front (FLN) members convicted of pro-Algerian independence activities.[9]

The Rivesaltes camp, therefore, came to be known for housing soldiers, French citizens whom the government removed from society, and civilians who were "undesirable foreigners"—whether prisoners or refugees. The state subjected these populations to military surveillance, kept watch over them with a network of officials, isolated them from their neighbors, and sheltered them in poorly-constructed buildings with unsanitary conditions. Just five months after FLN internees vacated the premises, the government decided to recycle this locale in the wake of another twentieth-century "tragic event" as a "housing camp" for an additional group, harkis. But they were not military personnel, nor prisoners, nor (legally) refugees.

During the Algerian War of Independence harkis were the minority of native Algerians who fought in French Army units denominated *harkas*, a derivative of the Arabic word for movement, *haraka*, which aptly represented their function of patrolling the nearby countryside for supporters of the FLN. Following the March 1962 ceasefire the government applied this generic term—which denoted the greatest number of the five types of native Algerian auxiliary forces—to categorize all men, women, and children whose lives were threatened owing to their real or perceived pro-French allegiance.[10] As the war drew to a close, the French government's policy prescribed disarming harki soldiers and encouraging them to return to their villages, where the Army could not protect them. At this time, FLN members who believed that the "Algerian Revolution" (their appellation for the war) did not end with the Évian Peace Treaty sought to exact revenge on harkis.

From spring 1962 until the end of the decade, an estimated 100,000 harkis (in the term's postwar broader definition) fled the torture and executions carried out by insurgents who deemed their fellow Algerians as traitors.[11] They arrived in France as "repatriates"—a legal classification describing the relationship between the state and French citizens returning from all former colonies and protectorates—with the possibility of completing a pro forma procedure for French nationality. Approximately half of the harkis found housing on their own, through the aid of French soldiers who had fought in Algeria, benevolent associations, or familial and social networks. However, the French government relegated the half that relied on its assistance to former refugee and prisoner camps as well as forest hamlets (isolated prefabricated developments, which were microcosms of the larger camps). Most resided in these spaces for weeks or months, though some remained for over a decade.

Between September 1962 and December 1964 the Joffre camp lodged a total of 20,000 of the 66,000 harkis whom the Service central des rapatriés estimated migrated to France by 1965.[12] At its most densely populated, during the first week of December 1962 (see figure 1), the Rivesaltes camp's 8,885 harkis[13] dwarfed the town's 6,262 inhabitants.[14] The choice to house these former "pro-French" imperial citizens in this space for unwanted residents, as France grappled with the loss of its 132-year empire amidst an influx of 354,914 pieds-noirs during June 1962 alone, raises the series of questions that are the subject of this article.[15] Why did the government put harkis in the Rivesaltes camp? What were the harkis' lives like at the Rivesaltes camp? What do government officials' decisions to place the harkis in the Rivesaltes camp and keep it open for twenty-seven months indicate about their conception of this population as repatriates and French citizens? What have been the repercussions of this encampment for the harkis?

Figure 1. Monthly population statistics of the harkis residing in the Rivesaltes camp from 3 October 1962 to 1 February 1964.[16]



All harkis who migrated to France faced numerous obstacles in the government's perception and treatment of them as French citizens and repatriates, which served to isolate them from society. On one hand, officials continually confused them with Algerian labor migrants and, on the other, the government enacted policies that limited benefits to which they were entitled as repatriates. Even though harkis residing in the Rivesaltes camp were not prisoners like previously interned populations, their placement in camps—where military and civilian agents closely watched over them—added an additional layer to their isolation and stigmatization. The government's decision to house harkis in this space was both cause and effect of how French government officials viewed all harkis in France. They were aliens: Berber and Arab repatriates, nearly all of whom obtained French nationality shortly after they arrived in France, who were the target of government housing policies that distanced them from public view. The Rivesaltes camp's architecture, insalubrious living conditions, isolation from French citizens, military oversight, and "reeducation" classes, beyond functioning as powerful symbols, reinforced—and contributed to—the government's treatment of the harkis as aliens. Over the twenty-seven months that it functioned as a camp for harkis, Rivesaltes

fostered an exilic existence for these harkis and socially excluded them from French society.

The exclusionary nature of this housing policy for these former soldiers and civilians who risked their lives for France—and were constrained to leave Algeria for this reason—becomes more pronounced when compared with that established for the nearly one million French repatriates from Algeria, or pieds-noirs. The government neither wanted nor expected the migration of the latter either, yet it lodged these repatriates of European and Jewish origins initially in requisitioned hotels and emergency shelters—and never in camps.[17]

Through an investigation of the creation and implementation of government policies at the Rivesaltes camp, this article sheds light on the harkis' experiences at France's largest harki camp. It further demonstrates the challenges that their ambiguous status posed to where and how the government housed them, in 1962 and beyond. My sources include documents from presidential, ministerial, departmental, local, associational, and private archival collections—most of which required special permission to access—as well as a series of newspaper articles from a local daily, *L'Indépendant*. To date most publications about harkis who migrated to France are written by social scientists, primarily focus on measuring integration of harki children and identity construction, and draw principally from interviews and secondary sources.[18] This essay begins to fill in lacunae in this scholarship.[19] Moreover, it analyzes this significant episode in the harkis' history by drawing on the insights of recent studies concerning the complex relationship between the French government and Algerians on both sides of the Mediterranean at the end of the Empire[20] and the social exclusion from French society of migrant populations.[21]

The Arrival of Harki "Repatriates" in France

Most of the violence that took place after the ceasefire in Algeria targeted the harkis. A French government report issued at the signing of the Évian Accords approximated that 2,500 harkis were killed and 3,900 more were injured during the war.[22] Estimates from historians and reports by government officials about the number of harkis assassinated by Algerians from March 1962 onward range from tens of thousands to a hundred thousand, which does not include those who survived acts of torture. In particular, executions spiked once France transferred its power to the Algerian government on 3 July 1962 and the French Army could no longer legally intervene in Algerian internal affairs. National Liberation Army members and civilians carried out, in the words of the Senior Commander of French Armed Forces in Algeria, an "*épuration*"—the term used to describe the purge of Vichy collaborators after the 1944 Liberation of France.[23] In the absence of conclusive data, however, the debate over the precise figure of harkis executed is difficult to resolve.[24]

The scale of retribution and bloodshed was nevertheless sufficient to drive harkis to France in droves. French government officials had not anticipated this large-scale migration, which is reflected in their subsequent hastily-made decisions. Despite official policy to "limit repatriation" only to harkis facing "real and precise threats," nearly one hundred thousand Berber and Arab harki "repatriates" migrated from Algeria to a metropolitan France that proved ill-prepared for their arrival for two principal reasons.[25] First, Prime Minister Michel Debré failed to heed the recommendations of a commission that had been established to develop a plan to repatriate and rehouse the harkis. And second, the secretary of state for Repatriates focused almost exclusively on resettling pieds-noirs.

Given these factors, when the first French naval vessels carrying harkis arrived in Marseille on 11 June 1962, the government opted to house them in military, refugee, and prisoner camps in isolated corners of France.[26] Initially, the government sheltered them in tents and barracks near the Massif Central in the Larzac military camp, which had been the largest camp for FLN prisoners in France during the war, and in tents at the Bourg-Lastic military base in Auvergne, which was opened "rather 'in emergency'" to shelter the overflow harkis.[27] In fall 1962 the government decided to replace these temporary "transit camps" with four "housing camps"—Rivesaltes, Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise, Bias, and La Rye-Vigéant.

The government offered three practical motivations for the harkis' encampment. First, officials viewed the harkis as unable to adapt to life in metropolitan France without first being given "a more profound knowledge of the French language and of [French] morals," which reeducation centers at the camps would provide.[28] As the National Police claimed in an internal report in October 1962, these centers would "knock the rough edges off the former auxiliary soldiers."[29] Second, officials believed that placing the harkis in concentrated spaces would be the best means for military personnel, on the one hand, to protect them and, on the other, to control their potentially subversive actions. This military surveillance aimed both to curb reprisals by FLN members in France and to hinder the infiltration of the camps by non-harki Algerians fleeing to the metropole. It also intended to inhibit the recruitment of harkis into pro-FLN factions as well as to limit their contacts with OAS members, whom the government and media outlets believed posed safety threats on metropolitan soil.[30] Finally and foremost, the post-Second World War housing crisis, compounded by the concomitant emergency "exodus" of pieds-noirs, meant that there were few places to lodge the fleeing harkis.[31] Initial discussions among government officials proposed sheltering harki families in abandoned villages in southern France, but this plan could not go forward because, though vacant, the houses still had owners.[32]

The government's different housing policies for the harkis and the pieds-noirs stemmed in part from a distinction in these two groups' statuses. In terms of nationality, a July 1962 ordinance issued by President Charles de

Gaulle specified that residents of Algeria who had been "French with common civil status"—European settlers, Jews, and the infinitesimal number of Muslim Algerians who had renounced Sharia law—remained French citizens. The legislation required those "with local civil status" (an inferior citizenship category during the colonial era for native Algerians that included almost all harkis) to request French nationality in front of a judge on metropolitan soil.[33] Despite difficulties obtaining the required paperwork, administrative delays in according nationality, and some harkis being unaware that they needed to even apply for nationality, in the end the procedure proved largely a formality. Eighty-six percent of the nearly seventy thousand harkis who requested French nationality between 1962 and 1970 became French citizens.[34] However, even after an official change in status, government policies continued to differentiate between these two groups of citizens.

The government categorized both harkis and pieds-noirs as repatriates when they landed on French soil. Therefore, as per a 26 December 1961 law, harkis were eligible for the same social and economic benefits as pieds-noirs to support their integration into metropolitan society (such as loans, special access to HLM housing, and indemnities for lost goods and property in Algeria).[35] Nonetheless, as long as harkis remained in camps, they could not receive these allocations, and subsequent legislation mandated that pieds-noirs had priority access to integrated public housing buildings.[36] The harkis' de facto status, in part owing to a significant percentage residing in camps, more closely resembled that of refugees, a designation that government officials consistently used for them in reports and written communications. Yet, the harkis were never accorded refugee status, which would have allowed international organizations such as the High Commission for Refugees to be involved in protecting and administering them.[37] The rest of this article will illustrate that the gap between harkis' de jure status and their de facto position is attributable not only to placing them in camps, but also to specific practices at the Rivesaltes camp.

Tents and Barracks

On 15 September 1962 the Rivesaltes camp received eight hundred harkis arriving directly from the Tefeschoun refugee camp located outside of Algiers.[38] Over the next nine days, the entire harki population from the Bourg-Lastic transit camp, which had numbered 5,083 people on 30 August, traveled by train to Rivesaltes and was grouped into villages of tents on the camp's vast plain.[39] By 3 October, with harkis from the Larzac transit camp who had been transferred to Rivesaltes, the population swelled to 7,700 harkis.[40] Their placement in tents was significant because these structures reinforced the harkis' exile from their surrounding community and their perceived inferiority to neighboring French citizens. The tents, and the renovated military barracks where the harkis would subsequently be housed, presented a rupture with the

nearby architecture of rural farmhouses and implicitly proclaimed their power over the camp's subjugated population. Portions of the camp were encircled by barbed wire, a material that functioned to prevent not only the harkis from leaving, but also those outside from having contact with the harkis. Watchtowers, though no longer used for observation when the harkis arrived, still dotted the perimeter. These structures contributed to the architecture of domination already present on the premises, to borrow Michel Foucault's understanding of camps' architecture as an operation of power, discipline, and control.[41] Originally built to lodge military, refugee, and prisoner populations, the harkis' living space in Rivesaltes operated like the camp's earlier iterations and other camps, whose general function Foucault describes as: "to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them."[42] Camp residents were further stigmatized by their overcrowded living quarters and the lack of hygienic facilities, which induced insalubrious conditions.

On 18 September 1962 Minister of Armies Pierre Messmer issued a ten-page memo enumerating "general rules" for the Rivesaltes camp's structures, discipline, and cleanliness.[43] Among the provisions, Messmer urged that each tent house only one family, collective toilets and sinks be installed, lighting be provided inside the tents, pipes be laid to vacate wastewater, and three blocks of barracks be reconstructed immediately.[44] Multiple firsthand accounts from fall 1962 indicate that camp officials did not implement these changes. A Ministry of Repatriates representative who visited the camp on a rainy 15 October observed that orders had not yet been given to restore the barracks, which were "in terrible shape," as the roofs leaked and the walls were crumbling. He contended that the harkis "absolutely cannot live any longer in tents" because they provide "very illusory protection" from the violent, cold *tramontane* wind and rain. (Muddy water continually ran under the canvas.)[45] Muslim notable Bachaga Boualam, the symbol of "pro-French Muslims" who had served in the French Army, visited harkis repatriated from his tribal territory in the late fall and echoed the criticism of these structures.[46] He remarked that ten to twelve people—not always from the same family—were crammed into each "ragged" tent, which had no lights or heating mechanisms.[47] Finally, at a 19 November 1962 meeting of the National Committee for the Muslim French (CNMF), a joint public-private "rescue committee" to aid harkis in Algeria and France, retired General Secretary of the Ministry of Armies Jean Olié reported that the harkis' "situation is embarrassing for France." After a tour of the camp, he, too, noted that there were no lights or heating in the tents and remarked that the bathrooms were "very insufficient" since they lacked toilets and showers.[48]

The government was not oblivious to these defects. To address the harkis' poor living conditions, a group of local and national government and military officials who met on 24 October 1962 in Perpignan unveiled a program for a joint effort to reconstruct three blocks of crumbling barracks (comprising 1,400 housing units) by 15 January 1963.[49] The government opted to use the

structures that were in satisfactory condition for supplies, job training classrooms, schoolrooms, an officers' mess, officers' barracks, and an infirmary. On 21 November, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou penned a letter to Messmer underscoring the persistence of the harkis' "very defective living conditions," aggravated by a particularly cold, rainy spell and an insufficient supply of warm clothing.[50] At this time, all of the harkis—unused to the harsher French climate—still lived in tents without running water and electricity.

The harkis' unhygienic living conditions did not end once they migrated the one to three kilometers from their tents into the barracks on the camp's easternmost extremity. Despite the slow start to construction, all of the harkis had moved into the permanent structures by 8 January 1963.[51] Each distinct housing block measured approximately one square kilometer with barracks laid out in rows with as many as thirteen buildings next to each other, the same layout used during the camp's previous iterations.[52] These structures, like the tents, were both cause and effect of the power relationship between the harkis and the French government. The cramped, unsanitary conditions in the barracks were simultaneously a means for officials to exert dominance over the harkis and a consequence of the government's decision to house them in a camp.

When the government reconstructed the barracks, it did not choose to make the structures large enough to accommodate the harki families. Their new homes measured between twenty and twenty-five square meters in a refurbished rectangular building, which consisted of three to four units with two rooms and three small windows (as shown in figure 2). These residences well exceeded the legal population limit for public housing facilities constructed by the state: according to a 30 June 1961 decree, dwellings for more than three occupants needed to contain at least three rooms.[53] The government disregarded this requirement when housing the large harki families, thereby overcrowding each unit almost without exception.

The harkis' cramped living situation led to health problems, which the government ultimately chose to blame on the harkis' inferior and foreign ways—and not on the housing structures. In January 1963 Dr. Aujaleu, the Ministry of Health's public health director, warned top Ministry of Repatriates official Yves Pérony of a tuberculosis epidemic sweeping through the camp. He attributed the spread of the disease to "the conditions of promiscuity in which members of the same family, and harki families among themselves, live, whether they are housed in tents or in buildings," as well as many harkis' refusal to be hospitalized when infected.[54] However, three months later with tuberculosis still rampant, he shifted the blame from the physical space, void of internal plumbing, to the harkis themselves. The director of the Army's health services claimed that the disease was not spreading because of a lack of medical treatment: "[O]ne must note that the ways and customs of these Muslim populations posed the same type of difficulties to health workers in Algeria, and that their migration to the metropole has not radically altered their inherited traditions."[55] Unlike the January letter that voiced concerns

Figure 2. Hollowed out barrack

The walls dividing each unit, not shown in this image, were located where the diagonal wooden beams stretch from midway down the wall.

Source: Photograph taken by the author in January 2007.

about the difficulties that the physical dwellings engendered for the harkis' health, this correspondence contained no reference to the harkis' overcrowded living conditions in the barracks as a reason for the spread of tuberculosis. Instead, health officials chose to turn the disease-prone Muslims into scapegoats for the proliferation of disease. They did not recognize that such outbreaks were endemic to the Rivesaltes camp throughout its history.

The camp structures and the insalubrious living conditions they induced directly contributed to the harkis' physical exile from the surrounding French community and, in turn, implicitly conveyed that the harkis were aliens on French soil. The camp's architecture of domination continually reminded the population of its inferiority to other French citizens by relying on visible markers such as the barbed wire fencing, tents, and barracks that disfigured the Catalan countryside. How government officials used the camp's physical space, however, was not the only way that they exerted control over the harkis. An intricate network of military officers, policemen, and Ministry of Repatriates' employees closely monitored their movements and daily life.

The Power of *Encadrement*

The French verb *encadrer*, which translates as "to surround with a frame," provides a fitting image of how the Rivesaltes camp's setup and personnel created physical and psychological borders around its resident harkis. Since the late nineteenth century French administrators had employed the term *encadrement*, initially for single male French workers and more recently for foreign (often colonial) populations, to describe state agents' authority over these individuals' lives.[56] *Encadrement* for harkis at the Rivesaltes camp involved a network of state agents with a dual objective: maintaining order and education. Consequently, the power dynamic created by *encadrement* exiled them from everyday societal structures. Government agents' treatment of the harkis, though intended to be temporary, served to permanently mark the harkis as different from their neighbors, indeed as "aliens."

Top government officials regarded the principle of *encadrement* as a panacea for the grave problems encountered during Rivesaltes' first few months. Police reports disclosed several troubling events, which threatened the camp's internal stability and, according to Minister of Armies Messmer, endangered the security of neighboring regions.[57] In October 1962 one harki beat another to death[58] and a grenade exploded in close proximity to a group of harkis on the outskirts of the camp.[59] The next month the gendarmerie seized a 7.65 caliber pistol from a harki.[60] Moreover, while the women spent their days tending to their children, the men did not have jobs and, in the words of Prime Minister Pompidou, "their idleness" left them to "stroll around." Pompidou directly attributed this idleness, which in his view provoked such dangerous incidents, to the absence of a camp director and to a lack of "*encadrement* and … control by the appropriate police," that is, troops who had recently returned from Algeria.[61]

On 7 December 1962 the Army designated a veteran field officer who had served two tours of duty in Algeria to manage the camp's daily operations. According to Messmer, the director was, therefore, appropriately familiar with the "Muslim milieu" and previous policies of colonial dominance.[62] The next day Pompidou argued in a letter to Messmer that because the harkis "are used to a military type of organization with firm *encadrement*" they should be subject to stricter discipline.[63] Messmer's cabinet director, who visited the camp one week later, agreed by replying to Pompidou that the Army would henceforth have "a 'less civilian' conception" of the harkis' living situation and increase the number of *encadrement* agents.[64]

The new director oversaw the two parallel *encadrement* structures at the camp: a military section consisting of officers and policemen and a civil section comprised of nurses, doctors, social workers, teachers, and administrative staff.[65] Messmer defined the Rivesaltes military officers' principal duty as "encadrement" and specified, "[T]hey will participate in maintaining discipline."[66] A lieutenant aided by several noncommissioned Algerian and French

officers directed each five hundred person village of tents and a captain supervised two or three of these villages. The officers were charged with providing for the harkis' material needs, such as organizing the distribution of food and arranging for medical care.[67] The Army tasked the camp's military police with maintaining "the camp's physical and mental salubrity" and guaranteeing safety in the camp. This included disciplining those who disturbed the peace, reporting the most serious problems to the local police, seeking out information about interactions between harkis and extremist groups (notably the FLN), and encouraging men and children to participate in activities to keep up their morale.[68] This system of control resembled that used for refugees interned in the Rivesaltes camp during the Second World War.

The military structure worked in tandem with civilian employees of the Ministry of Repatriates who staffed the headquarters and those who were course instructors for the camp's "Social Advancement" program. To prepare harkis for life in metropolitan France, state agents offered French language and customs, job training, personal hygiene, and childcare classes for adults, and educational and leisure activities for children. The underlying principle, indeed the motor, of social advancement was the deployment of appropriate personnel to teach and *encadrer* the Rivesaltes-dwelling harkis. When the program's first director, General Pierre de Segonzac, issued a six-page directive in October 1962 outlining how "Social Advancement" would function, he did not open with a description of what activities and classes would be offered. Rather, he launched into an explanation of the personnel who would "*encadrer*" the harkis and how they should do it.[69] De Segonzac underscored in the memo's conclusion that the program's success would be measured by avoiding the creation of "Palestinian camps," where nearly one million refugees who were forced from their homeland after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War permanently settled, unassimilated into their surrounding community. He argued that to prevent a similar outcome for the harkis, it was a "moral obligation" for the "*cadres*" not only to educate them, but also to "discipline" them.[70] Yet, he believed that to effectively teach the harkis about metropolitan ways of life, they must be isolated from the surrounding population while residing in the camps.

Another Isolated Population

Although the 20,000 harkis who passed through the Rivesaltes camp came in contact with a great number of harkis speaking multiple Arabic and Berber dialects, they had little association with their neighbors. On average, each week between 1 December 1962 and 28 December 1963, 207 harkis arrived on the Catalonian plain and 280 others departed for jobs across France in factories, in coalmines, on construction sites, on farms, and on forestry worksites.[71] The transient harki population at Rivesaltes formed a community of exile iso-

lated from other French citizens. Their living conditions resembled that which the camp's previous incarcerated populations had experienced, even if the harkis were not prisoners. Harkis certainly faced linguistic barriers to communicating with the surrounding population. However, the state's policies that aimed to limit interactions between them and their neighbors and to control the information divulged to the public about their life at the camp in fact relegated language to an ancillary reason for the Rivesaltes harkis' exile. This situation provoked myriad questions about their place in French society for the harkis themselves, for the French public, and for the French government.

The government's intention behind putting the harkis in isolated camps with military and police supervision was in part to protect them from vengeful FLN members who deemed their compatriots who had joined the French cause traitors. Nevertheless, by restricting the relationship between these two groups, the government simultaneously placed the harkis into a category over which the state exercised strict surveillance and of which it was circumspect. The North African Coordination and Information Service (SCINA), an arm of the Ministry of the Interior created in 1958 at the height of the Algerian War of Independence to monitor North African—namely Algerian—immigrants in the metropole, issued daily bulletins that described in eerily-close detail their movements and actions. Including reports on harkis in these police bulletins resulted in increased supervision and control over them, which restricted their interactions with those outside of the camp and aroused simultaneously suspicions about them. Moreover, by incorporating harkis into the bulletins the state lumped the population into the broader—undesirable—category of North African immigrants. It did so while concurrently referring to harkis as "refugees" in the reports. This reinforced the ambiguity of their status and further distanced them from the categories of repatriates and citizens.

Five SCINA reports in November and December 1962 attested to problems that arose when FLN members permeated the camp's boundaries. For instance, one bulletin contains a report, in a rather annoyed tone, by the local military police about FLN militants who arrived in France "under the pretext of looking for work, [and who] ha[d] the audacity to go to the camp to contact family members." On 29 November several Rivesaltes harkis identified two of these Algerians as FLN agents (their full names and places of residence in Algeria were given in the report) and, consequently, they were nearly lynched. The report also indicated that some harkis—referred to as "Rivesaltes refugees"—had considered creating clandestine vigilante organizations to protect themselves and their families.[72]

The national government responded to these interactions between harkis and FLN members by intensifying its efforts to seal off the camp. On 8 December 1962, Prime Minister Pompidou wrote to Minister of Armies Messmer that in order to avoid such incidents in the future "we should subject [the harkis'] comings and goings to a definite surveillance; leaving the camp should only be authorized for serious reasons."[73] By trying to close the camp to FLN mem-

bers (albeit with mixed success), the government also limited the harkis' contact with—thereby distinguishing them from—another group of "outsiders," their neighbors.

The municipal government's actions simultaneously challenged the harkis' membership in the commune. For the entire twenty-seven months that the Rivesaltes camp was home to the harkis, minutes from monthly Rivesaltes town council meetings mention the population just once. On 21 June 1963, Mayor Émile Parès named the director of the Ministry of Repatriates branch office at the camp, René Aucante, "Special assistant for the 'Town of the Rivesaltes Camp.'"[74] However, subsequent meetings contained neither discussions about the camp nor reports from Aucante, which, along with his title, suggests that local officials did not consider the camp a part of their municipality. Moreover, decisions made by Mayor Parès reinforced the notion that the harkis were outsiders. For instance, he refused to allocate local funds to compensate housing costs for the instructors who worked at the camp's school, as required by national law. The mayor denied the teachers this right because he did not regard the school for harki children as a municipal establishment and, therefore, he argued, it should not draw on the Rivesaltes town budget.[75]

Similarly, the few recorded interactions between *Rivesaltais* and harkis were often marked by strife, echoing the tone that the local government set. For example, on 28 October 1962 approximately one hundred harkis and their wives, twenty-five of whom were registered to vote, walked to the Rivesaltes town hall to cast their ballot for the referendum on determining the Fifth Republic president by universal suffrage. According to a report from the National Police, the group encountered four locals who "provoked turmoil among the group" and tried to prevent them from voting.[76] These actions demonstrate suspicion in regard to the new residents, who were, on the one hand, just another transient immigrant/refugee population succeeding those that had inhabited the camp since 1939 and, on the other, French citizens who shared the same civic rights as the *Rivesaltais*.

This confrontation can in part be ascribed to the local population's ignorance of who their new neighbors were. The harkis' lives at the Joffre camp were shrouded in mystery because the government refused to permit journalists and civilians onto the campgrounds until a visit in March 1963 by a team of reporters from a regional newspaper, *L'Indépendant*. Between 22 and 28 March the pro-Gaullist daily, undoubtedly selected for its political leanings, published a series of five articles about the harkis, who had hitherto been hidden behind the barbed wire encircling the camp. Newspaper officials, whose curiosity was "aroused" by the secrecy enveloping the camp in what was now the second largest city in the department, had requested permission many times over five months before Messmer acquiesced.[77] The harkis' first months in the camp—when they lived in tents, had no working showers, and suffered through a particularly harsh fall and winter—would, therefore, remain invisible to their fellow citizens. Nonetheless, the author of the third article offered

an apology for the government's actions to shield the harkis from the public eye by pronouncing: "Given the massive arrival of these individuals whose future was not certain, authorities preferred to show us things once they were in order and there was a blue sky over the camp. Perhaps this is not too journalistic, but it is logical. And when we saw the enormous work completed in a few months, we honestly could not hold it against those who made us wait."[78] Camp officials' dominance over the harkis' lives, coupled with the authors' "not too journalistic" ways and Gaullist bias, skewed the entire series of articles.

When the readers of *L'Indépendant* were finally allowed to peer in on their new neighbors, the articles painted a Panglossian picture of the well-oiled machine and the pleasant space that camp officials wanted other French citizens to see. The third piece claimed that the public would now have a positive vision of the Rivesaltes camp and "no longer consider it as a ghost town or a vestige of the recent past, but instead as the beginning of a bright future."[79] In fact, the articles questioned what type of space Rivesaltes constituted; the second article claimed: "It's no longer a camp. It's truly a city like no other in France, and no other city with the same type of population is so well organized socially."[80] Though these sentences do refer to its appreciable organization, which simultaneously connoted a dynamic of power over the harkis, the categorization as a city negates the space's true function as a camp whose residents lived in refugee conditions.

While acknowledging that most residents had large families, the articles neglected to mention the cramped conditions harkis endured in their meager units. Instead, the series emphasized the vastness of the campgrounds and their similar geography to Algeria, thus giving the impression that these individuals had an abundance of space that felt like home. As the third article in the series related, "[a] vast plain that looks like it could be the sister of those in Algeria: a plain that recalls the foothills of Corbières and the Aurès mountains…."[81] While the articles do refer many times to the harkis' "disorientation," they attribute a palliative function to the physical space and order that Rivesaltes offered. The same piece claimed, "They are 'uprooted persons,' which the ground of Rivesaltes, this red-clay ground with its stones, improved as much as possible by the Army, will help them to take root and to blossom once again with the sun."[82]

Such positive reports in the press failed to discern the disorientation that camp dwellers were to later express in published memoirs and interviews, and they failed too to discover the hygiene problems that scores of official documents written in 1962 and 1963 disclosed.[83] The fourth article in *L'Indépendant*, for example, reported that sanitary conditions were excellent and that cases of illnesses, such as trachoma, indigenous to "warm countries," were becoming less and less common. The piece further emphasized that all harkis were x-rayed as a preventative measure and that "as soon as a case presents itself, the doctors warn health officials in Perpignan who admit the individual

to the hospital."[84] As cited above, sealed government documents written at precisely the same time demonstrate that the tuberculosis epidemic greatly concerned camp health officials who encountered difficulties ensuring that the harkis sought out proper treatments.

The policies that national government officials created and Rivesaltes camp local agents enacted to strictly control the harkis' daily life masked many of the difficult aspects of their situation from public view and inhibited the population from interacting with their *Rivesaltais* neighbors. In turn, local officials declared the camp as outside the boundaries of their municipality, just as they and their predecessors had done while the camp had housed refugees and prisoners.

Conclusion

In July 1964 Minister of Armies Messmer's cabinet director, Jean Sicurani, responded to a query about whether camp officials should admit a group of thirty-six harkis who had just debarked in France. His succinct answer was yes: "These refugees, who have the status of repatriates, should be accommodated at the Rivesaltes camp." He continued, nonetheless, by emphasizing that those who do not apply for French nationality would not be considered repatriates and, therefore, must be expelled from the camp.[85]

This letter, written nearly two years after the first group of harkis arrived in Rivesaltes, illustrates much of what I have argued here. Sicurani's words convey the ambiguity of the harkis' status as both refugees and repatriates, a hybrid status that they had acquired even before they entered the camps, but which was further reinforced by residing there. Camps such as Rivesaltes have traditionally exiled foreigners whom the government wanted to separate from society. The harkis were no different in that respect. The government did not consider the harkis to be repatriates like the pieds-noirs. One could argue that this distinction was made in part because the harkis did not automatically retain their French nationality after Algerian independence, as did the pieds-noirs. Nevertheless, Sicurani highlights that only if these harkis applied to become French citizens would they be allowed to reside at the Rivesaltes camp, in the primitive, exilic conditions under surveillance detailed above. Indeed, the camp both reinforced and contributed to the government's conception of the harkis as aliens of a particular kind: French citizens, yet the target of unique housing policies that hid them from public view.

The government's choices to relegate to Rivesaltes approximately a third of the harkis who had fled to France by 1965, and then to structure the camp experience as it did, had several repercussions for the entire harki population in France. Minister Delegate for Repatriates Roger Romani acknowledged these long-term effects in 1994: "The difficulties of the initial arrival [of harkis in France], marked by their confinement in camps and grouping into *quartiers*

difficiles, led to situations of suffering that were sometimes extreme. The consequences are still visible today."[86] By isolating harkis initially, the government established a logic for continuing to do so. First, these decisions opened the door to the harkis' future placement in smaller rural camps (forest hamlets and housing centers) or urban HLM complexes. All of these solutions perpetuated their residing exclusively with other harki families and being subject to *encadrement* by social counselors and camp directors, many of whom had worked at Rivesaltes. The seventy-two forest hamlets and two housing centers (used for those considered "*incasables*"—widows, the ill, and the elderly) had additional features that rendered them microcosms of the Rivesaltes camp. These spaces were situated in isolated areas, often several kilometers from the nearest small town, and were overseen by military personnel. Since the government initially envisioned forest hamlets as a temporary solution and constructed them in emergency conditions, they contained poorly-insulated prefabricated buildings with external showers and toilets. These resembled the barracks at Rivesaltes with three to five small apartments per building (though 37.5 square meters instead of 25 square meters), which were lined up in rows to accommodate 25 to 60 families. In January 1965, 60 of these small camps hidden in the southern French countryside housed 9,720 harkis;[87] a decade later, 31 forest hamlets still sheltered 5,275 harkis.[88] Today, one forest hamlet remains, in Fuveau, and houses exclusively harki families, though void of *encadrement* and with buildings reconstructed in the mid-1970s. Continued residence in mini versions of the Rivesaltes camp prolonged these harkis' segregation from other French citizens, as well as questions about their status.

The exile of twenty thousand harkis at the Rivesaltes camp has also influenced the memory of the entire population's history and recent state memorial initiatives. During the mid-1970s and early 1990s, harki community members protested their poor treatment by the government. Demonstrators used camps as a vehicle for their protests by blockading entrances, taking camp directors hostage, and burning cars on the premises. Press outlets covering these events both revealed images that brought into relief the most deplorable camp conditions and printed the fiery words of harki militants. Their rhetoric during the first wave of demonstrations dubbed past and present camps, including Rivesaltes, as "camps de concentration" and grossly overstated the number of harkis who resided in them. Focusing the protests on these spaces, which housed only 16,000 of the 180,000 harkis in 1974 (not the "vast majority" as the leader of demonstrations in summer 1975 claimed), and making parallels with Jews during the Second World War resulted in essentializing the plight of all harkis.[89] This incorrect notion of a homogenous harki experience, that of being parked in camps for over a decade, marked how government officials would subsequently portray the harkis. For instance, in a 1994 National Assembly session Minister Delegate for Repatriates Romani asserted: "[T]hese men and women lost everything and most of them lived for a long time in rundown projects, forest hamlets far away from urban centers

or hastily rebuilt military camps."[90] In the mid-1970s the camps significantly emerged as the lasting symbol of the entire harki population's failed integration and marginalization. Camps—and especially Rivesaltes because it had housed the greatest number of harkis—became the harkis' *lieux de mémoire* in a late twentieth-century French society that increasingly turned its gaze toward commemorating the past.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, the French government enacted three measures for the harkis: two laws (1994 and 2005) to officially recognize and compensate harki soldiers and a national day in their honor (2001). State commemorations of the harki population called attention to the deleterious aftereffects of camp living conditions. Although French citizens, their place in society still remained ambiguous as they often were confused with Algerian immigrants, who excluded harkis from their communities and whose history significantly differed. Moreover, harki repatriates had not received the same government compensation as had pied-noir repatriates. When the sponsor of the 1994 legislation, Roger Romani, presented the bill to the National Assembly he directly linked Rivesaltes and the three other camps opened in 1962 to the older harkis' loss of "dignity" and their children's "often dramatic failures" in terms of integration, schooling, jobs, and delinquency.[91] (For example, he revealed that in 1993 children aged 18 to 25 residing in the twelve remaining housing complexes for harkis had an eighty percent unemployment rate and often suffered from acts of racism owing to their skin color.[92]) Likewise, the author of the 2005 legislation, Minister Delegate for Veterans Hamlaoui Mekachera, claimed in a National Assembly speech that the harkis' "scars" were the consequence of "the tragedy" of the massacres in Algeria and the "extremely difficult living conditions" they endured after migrating to France.[93]

Memorial initiatives went beyond the causal link between the harkis' encampment and the subsequent failed integration into French society that many in the population experienced. Occurring at a time when the French government confronted controversial events in its recent past, measures connected the harkis' history to that of other populations who suffered as a result of government policies. The harkis' placement into the Rivesaltes camp incorporates them into a list of foreign, refugee, and prisoner populations in the colony and metropole who had painful memories of internment during "the century of camps." In fact, the Rivesaltes Memorial proclaims itself "a referential space for the history of internment in France" by displaying "the history of this camp and the consequences of conflicts that forced into this locale foreigners whom the state considered undesirables (Spanish, Jews, Gypsies, Harkis…)."[94] Official commemorations of the harkis, moreover, significantly included apologies for previous French administrations' actions, similar to President Jacques Chirac acknowledging in 1995 the complicity of the French state in the 1942 Vélodrome d'Hiver roundup of Jews before their deportation. Chirac's comments at the inaugural National Day in Honor of the Harkis in

September 2001 asserted that the government's 1962 decision to "confine" harkis in camps and group them into *quartiers isolés*, made as a matter of "urgency," was an "error" that must be repaired. He argued that isolating the harkis in a *système des communautés*—which led to *situations de précarité* that still persist today—contradicted France's republican tradition.[95] Indeed, the Rivesaltes camp contributed to marking the harkis as "aliens" for decades after the twenty-seven months that it housed them.

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Notes

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1. Le mémorial de Rivesaltes, "Un peu d'histoire," Conseil général des Pyrénées-Orientales, http://www.cg66.fr/52-le-memorial-de-rivesaltes.htm. All translations are my own.
2. The French government opened the first camp, Rieucros (Lozère), in February 1939 for "les étranger indésirables." *Étrangers* is a legal status defined as a person living in France who does not have French nationality. Denis Peschanski, *La France des camps: L'internement, 1938–1946* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 15. On the French government's policies and reasoning for opening camps during this period, see pages 28–35.
3. Peschanski, *La France des camps*, 17. On the creation of the first camp, established in 1896 to "concentrate" civilians in Cuba during the War of 1895, see Annette Becker, "La genèse des camps de concentration," *Revue d'histoire de la Shoah* 189 (July-December 2008): 102–106. For an analysis of the function, definition, and sociology of camps in France lodging foreigners, see Marc Bernadot, *Camps d'étrangers* (Bellecombe-en-Bauges, France: Éditions du Croquant, 2008).
4. Peschanski, *La France des camps*, 111.
5. Quoted in Joël Mettay, *L'Archipel du mépris: Histoire du camp de Rivesaltes de 1939 à nos jours* (Canet: Éditions Trabucaire, 2001), 19.

6. Archives départementales des Pyrénées-Orientales (hereafter ADPO), 1419 W 109, Service départemental des Renseignements généraux, Rapport n° 107 de la Sûreté nationale, "Historique du camp de Rivesaltes," 8 January 1958.
7. Of the 5,174 foreign Jews interned at the "Rivesaltes National Roundup Center for Jews" between August and November 1942, 2,313 were sent to Auschwitz via Drancy. Anne Boitel, *Le Camp de Rivesaltes, 1941–1942: Du centre d'hébergement au "Drancy de la zone libre"* (Perpignan: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan, 2001), 20.
8. ADPO, 1419 W 109, "Historique du camp de Rivesaltes."
9. Nicolas Lebourg, "Histoire générale du Camp de Rivesaltes" (Journées du Patrimoine, Camp de Rivesaltes, 15 September 2007), 6.
10. Each auxiliary force performed different tasks to aid French soldiers or French civilian administrators and to protect the population from attacks by National Liberation Army (ALN) soldiers. On their different roles, see François-Xavier Hautreux, *La Guerre d'Algérie des harkis* (Paris: Perrin, 2013). Only a small minority of Algerian natives joined the French cause owing to their allegiance to France. The need for jobs in the face of the war-ravaged agrarian Algerian economy, forced recruitment by French soldiers with orders from the government to promote the appearance that Algerians were opposed to independence, and the quest for weapons to protect their families against FLN violence proved more salient factors in their decisions. Tom Charbit, *Les Harkis* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 29–31.
11. The figure of approximately 100,000 harkis is derived from several sources. First, the 1968 INSEE census determined that 87,816 harkis born in Algeria resided in France on 1 January 1968. However, the census failed to include data from the Midi-Pyrénées region, which a 1972 report financed by the National Committee for the Muslim French estimated contained 7,000 harkis (including children of harkis born in France). Archives du comité national pour les musulmans français (hereafter ANCMF), 6, Jean Servier, "Enquête sur les Musulmans Français," Part 1, 1. To these figures must be added harkis who migrated in 1968 and 1969, the approximate end of the migration. Data in the Secretary of State for Repatriates archives tallied 1,565 harkis who arrived from Algeria to Lascours, a camp run by the Ministry of the Interior. Centre des archives contemporaines (hereafter CAC), 199910281/4, Charts: "1968 Rapatriements Arrivées au C.T.R. de Lascours" and "1969 Rapatriements Arrivées au C.T.R. de Lascours." Nevertheless, these figures from 1968 and 1969 do not account for harkis who migrated without government aid.
12. The report from the Service central des rapatriés is cited in Conseil économique et social, "La Situation sociale des enfants de Harkis," prepared by Hafida Chabi. Published in *Journal Officiel de la République Française* (hereafter *JORF*), Avis et Rapports du Conseil économique et social, 2007, 24. The number of harkis residing in France in the years immediately following the war is difficult to determine because some arrived without government help and did not self-identify as harkis to officials.
13. Service historique de l'Armée de Terre (hereafter SHAT), 1R 337/1, Graph: Population au Camp de Rivesaltes, 1 December 1962 to 30 March 1963.
14. Archives Communales de Rivesaltes, "Évolution de la population depuis 1881."
15. Jean-Jacques Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil: Rapatriés et Pieds-Noirs en France* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), 66. The Service central des rapatriés estimated in a May 1996 report that a total of 969,257 French repatriates permanently migrated from Algeria to France. *Bilan de l'exécution de la loi du 26 décembre 1961 relative à l'accueil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer*, May 1996, 4. Quoted in Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris: Éditions EHESS, 2010), 15.
16. The statistics from 8 December 1962 to 28 December 1963 were gathered from the "compte-rendus hebdomadaires" in SHAT, 1R 336/8 and SHAT, 1R 337/1. The 3 October 1962 figure is from Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (here-

after ADBR), 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse quotidienne de renseignements, journées des 5, 6, 7 & 8 octobre 1962," e, N° 1 765. The 1 February 1964 figure is from ACNMF, 3/2, "Situation des Rapatriés Musulmans au 1er février 1964."

17. For an analysis of the pieds-noirs' emergency housing situation in 1962, see Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 161–71, as well as his article in this issue.
18. See, for example, Vincent Crapanzano, *The Harkis: The Wound That Never Heals* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2011) and Régis Pierret, *Les Filles et Fils de harkis: Entre double rejet et triple appartenance* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008).
19. Exceptions by historians comprise two articles about state policies toward the harkis and Algerian labor migrants grounded in archival documents by Sung Choi, including "The Muslim Veteran in Postcolonial France: The Politics of the Integration of Harkis After 1962," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 29, 1 (Spring 2011): 24–45 and "Les anciens combattants musulmans dans la France postcoloniale. La politique d'intégration des harkis après 1962," *Les Temps modernes* 666 (November–December 2011); two articles concerning memory construction in the harki community by Claire Eldridge: "'We've Never Had a Voice': Memory Construction and the Children of the Harkis (1962–1991)," *French History* 23, 1 (2009): 88–107 and "Blurring the Boundaries Between Perpetrators and Victims: *Pied-noir* Memories and the *Harki* Community," *Memory Studies* 3, 2 (2010): 123–36; Abderahmen Moumen's masters thesis based on documents from the Vaucluse archives: *Les Français musulmans en Vaucluse 1962–1991: Installation et difficultés d'intégration d'une communauté de rapatriés d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003); an article by Yann Scioldo-Zürcher about legislation for harki and pieds-noir repatriates: "Les harkis sont-ils des rapatriés comme les autres?" *Les Temps modernes* 666 (November–December 2011): 74–83; and a chapter concerning the harkis' arrival in France and post-Algerian War legal status grounded in archival documents in Todd Shepard's book: *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, "Rejecting the Muslims" (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 229–47.
20. See, for example, Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Amelia H. Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); and Sylvie Thénault, *Violence ordinaire dans l'Algérie coloniale: Camps, internements, assignations à résidence* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2012).
21. See, for example, Mary Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007) and Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control Between the Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
22. Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie (1954–1962)*, new ed. (Paris: La Découverte, 2001), 89.
23. SHAT, 1K 744, General de Brébisson to Minister of Armies (Cabinet), "Objet: Ex-supplétifs menacés," 1 August 1962.
24. Charles-Robert Ageron, the first scholar to consult documents in the Army Archives about the harkis after the thirty year waiting period expired in 1993, summarizes the varied estimates of harkis massacred advanced by government officials, journalists, and military officers in his article: "Le 'drame des harkis': Mémoire ou histoire?" *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire* 68 (October–December 2000): 9–11.
25. SHAT, 1H 1793/1, General de Brébisson, "Objet: Situation des ex-harkis en Algérie depuis le cessez-le-feu," 13 August 1962.
26. The first ship carried 200 harkis and their family members (totaling 651 people) and the transfer was expected to continue at a rhythm of approximately one boat per day until July 1, the eve of Algerian independence. ADBR, 138 W 3, SCINA, "Synthèse…, journée du 14 juin 1962," N° 1 706.

27. Marc Bernardot, "Être interné au Larzac: La politique d'assignation à résidence surveillée durant la guerre d'Algérie (1958–1962)," *Politix* 24, 69 (2004): 40. SHAT, 1K 744, "Note pour M. le Ministre," 28 June 1962. The phrase "un peu 'en catastrophe'" appeared in: SHAT, 14T 92, handwritten note by Ministry of Armies official, 1, 19 July 1965.
28. Archives nationales (hereafter AN), 5 AG 1/22, Minister of the Interior, "Rapport sur l'application de la loi du 26 décembre 1961 transmis au Secrétaire général de la Présidence de la République," 104, 26 July 1965.
29. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse…, journées des 5, 6, 7 & 8 octobre 1962," e-f, N° 1 765.
30. See, for example, Serge Bromberger, "Comment l'OAS tente d'installer des harkis en métropole," *Le Figaro*, 22 May 1962.
31. Moreover, during the previous decade the government resettled approximately 275,000 French repatriates from Indochina, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Colette Dubois, "La nation et les Français d'outre-mer: Rapatriés ou sinistrés de la décolonisation?" in *L'Europe retrouvée: Les migrations de la décolonisation*, ed. Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 91.
32. ACNMF, 25/17, Comité national de solidarité pour les Français Musulmans réfugiés, "Conseil d'administration du 3 août 1962," 2–3.
33. *JORF*, "Ordonnance n° 62-825 du 21 juillet 1962 relative à certaines dispositions concernant la nationalité française, prises en application de la loi n° 62-421 du 13 avril 1962," 22 July 1962, 7230.
34. ACNMF, 6, Servier, "Enquête sur les Musulmans Français," Part 1, 13.
35. *JORF*, "Loi n°61-1439 du 26 décembre 1961 relative à l'accueil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer," 28 December 1961, 11996-97.
36. See, for example, ACNMF, 15/13, Circular from the Ministry of Repatriates, "Objet: Attribution de logements H.L.M. aux anciens harkis," 1, N° 64/19, 31 January 1964.
37. In 1961 the High Commission for Refugees, the United Nations body responsible for overseeing international refugee law, reevaluated its mission and contemplated reorienting its focus toward Asian and African refugees. French officials opposed this prospect because they feared that this supranational commission would interfere with France's for its colonial affairs. Gérard Noiriel, *Réfugiés et sans-papiers: La République face au droit d'asile* (Paris: Hachette, 1998), 150.
38. ADPO, 1419 W 109, "Arrivées d'Algérie au Camp de Rivesaltes."
39. SHAT, 1R 336/8, Deputy chief of staff of the Army, "Transfert des ex supplétifs du Camp de Bourg-Lastic au Camp de Rivesaltes – Aménagement du Camp de l'Ardoise," 2, 11 September 1962.
40. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse..., journées des 5, 6, 7 & 8 octobre 1962," e, N° 1 765.
41. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), 171–72.
42. Ibid., 172.
43. SHAT, 7T 253/3, Minister of Armies, "Objet: Camps d'hébergement d'anciens supplétifs," 7, 18 September 1962.
44. Ibid., 3 and 5.
45. CAC, 19920149/1, SFIM, "Compte rendu de la tournée au camp de Rivesaltes," 1–2, 15 October 1962.
46. Bachaga is an Arabic word signifying high Arab dignitary. In late May 1962 the military organized the evacuation of 140 of the Bachaga Boualam's family members and entourage to the Mas-Thibert farm outside of Arles. This was the sole case of a collective repatriation by the government. Guilia Fabbiano, "Les harkis du Bachaga Boualam. Des Beni-Boudouanes à Mas-Thibert," in *Les Harkis dans la décolonisation*

et après, ed. Fatima Besnaci-Lancou and Gilles Manceron (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2008), 117.

47. Saïd Boualam, *Les Harkis au service de la France* (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1963), 268.
48. Quoted in André Wormser, *Pour l'honneur des harkis, 1 an de combats, 45 années de lutte* (Marseille: Éditions Sillages, 2009), 12. The word "embarrassing" (*indigne*) is underlined in the original text.
49. SHAT, 1K 744, "Centre d'hébergement des supplétifs musulmans de Rivesaltes. Séance plénière de travail tenue à la Préfecture des Pyrénées-Orientales le 24 octobre 1962 à 10 H," 3.
50. SHAT, 1K 744, Letter from Pompidou to Messmer, 21 November 1962.
51. SHAT, 1K 744, Letter from Messmer to Deputy Pierre Bas (Paris), 22 January 1963.
52. AN, F1a 5140, Génie-Direction de Toulouse, "Petit atlas des bâtiments militaires, Camp Joffre à Rivesaltes (Pyrénées-Orientales)."
53. The 30 June 1961 decree enumerating legal population limits is attached to: CAC, 19920149/1, SFIM, "Compte rendu de la tournée…".
54. SHAT, 1R 336/6, Director of Public Health, "Objet: Lutte antituberculeuse dans les camps ou les chantiers forestiers qui groupent des harkis," 8 January 1963.
55. SHAT, 1R 336/6, Central Administration of the Armies Health Service, "Objet: Problème de la lutte antituberculeuse dans les camps," 4 March 1963.
56. *Encadrement* is often translated into English as "surveillance" or "regimentation." These translations do not fully capture the great extent to which army and civilian officials used military-style tactics to closely supervise the harkis' lives. For this reason, *encadrement* is left in French. On *encadrement* structures used for single workers in the late nineteenth century, see Robert Castel, *Les Métamorphoses de la question sociale: Une chronique du salariat* (Paris: Fayard, 1995). On the "regimentation" of colonial and Chinese workers in France during World War I, see Tyler Stovall, "Colour-blind France? Colonial Workers during the First World War," *Race and Class* 35, 2 (1993): 35–55. On the surveillance of immigrants in France during the interwar period, see Lewis, *Boundaries of the Republic* and Rosenberg, *Policing Paris*.
57. SHAT, 1R 336/8, Letter from Messmer to Pompidou, 10 December 1962.
58. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse…, journée du 17 octobre 1962," 1.
59. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse..., journées des 27, 28 et 29 octobre 1962," 1.
60. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse..., journée du 27 novembre 1962," 1.
61. SHAT, 1R 336/8, Letter from Pompidou to the cabinet of the minister of Armies, 21 November 1962.
62. SHAT, 1R 336/8, Letter from Messmer to Pompidou, 10 December 1962.
63. SHAT, 1K 744, Letter from Pompidou to Messmer, 8 December 1962.
64. SHAT, 1R 336/8, Technical Adviser de Christen, "Inspection à Rivesaltes et à St. Maurice l'Ardoise des 13, 14, et 15 décembre 1962."
65. SHAT, 1K 744, Letter from Pompidou to Messmer, 21 November 1962.
66. SHAT, 7T 253/3, Minister of Armies, "Objet: Camps d'hébergement d'anciens supplétifs," Appendix, 2, 18 September 1962.
67. Ibid., 2.
68. Ibid., 3–4.
69. SHAT, 14T 92, General Pierre de Segonzac, "Objet: Action de promotion sociale en faveur des ex-supplétifs musulmans regroupés au Camp de RIVESALTES," 1, 5 October 1962.
70. Ibid., 6.
71. These figures were calculated using weekly bulletins from 1–8 December 1962 to 22–28 December 1963 sent from camp officials to Ministry of Armies officials in Paris. Copies are located in SHAT, 1R 336/8 and SHAT, 1R 337/1.
72. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse…, journée du 12 décembre 1962," d.

73. SHAT, 1K 774, Letter from Pompidou to Messmer, 8 December 1962.
74. Délibérations du Conseil municipal de Rivesaltes, 21 June 1963.
75. AN, F1a 5141, Jacques Toutain, "Objet: Matériel scolaire du Groupe scolaire du centre d'hébergement de harkis de Rivesaltes (P.O.)," 11 February 1963.
76. ADBR, 138 W 5, SCINA, "Synthèse..., journée du 30 octobre 1962," 1.
77. ADPO, 1111 PER 73, *L'Indépendant*, "Le camp des déracinés de Rivesaltes avec ses 10 000 harkis est devenu la 2e ville des Pyr.-Or.," 24 March 1963.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. ADPO, 1111 PER 73, *L'Indépendant*, "À Rivesaltes, l'école est un vrai plaisir pour les enfants de harkis tandis que leurs mères découvrent les humbles joies de coudre et de tricoter," 23 March 1963.
81. ADPO, 1111 PER 73, *L'Indépendant*, "Le camp des déracinés…".
82. Ibid.
83. Harki daughters Fatima Besnaci-Lancou and Dalila Kerchouche recount their families' memories of the Rivesaltes camp in Besnaci-Lancou, *Fille de harki: Le bouleversant témoignage d'une enfant de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 2003) and Kerchouche, *Mon père, ce Harki* (Paris: Seuil, 2003). Both women have also published interviews with former camp dwellers, which give texture to the population's experiences at Rivesaltes: Besnaci-Lancou, *Nos mères, paroles blessées* (Lunay, France: Zellige, 2006) and Kerchouche, *Destins de harkis* (Paris: Autrement, 2003).
84. ADPO, 1111 PER 73, *L'Indépendant*, "En un mois: 58 naissances, 3 décès. Bilan d'un camp où les harkis apprennent la vie à l'européenne," 25 March 1963.
85. SHAT, 19T 257/2, Minister of Armies cabinet director, "Objet: Arrivée de rapatriés Algériens au camp de Rivesaltes," 23 July 1964.
86. *JORF*, Assemblée nationale débats parlementaires (hereafter ANDP), "2e séance du 17 mai 1994," 1771.
87. CAC, 19910149/1, "Programme de construction pour les 'Harkis: II. Chantiers de forestage,'" 1 January 1965 and CAC 19920149/1, "Logement des ex-supplétifs musulmans rapatriés."
88. CAC, 19870444/15, "Situation des hameaux forestiers," 1, May 1979.
89. M'Hamed Laradji made this claim in Leo Palacio, "Pour obtenir leurs droits de Français à part entière," *Le Monde*, 12 October 1974. ACNMF, 16, CNMF, "Note sur les 'Harkis,'" 3, 2 February 1974.
90. *JORF*, ANDP, "2e séance du 17 mai 1994," 1773.
91. Ibid.
92. CAC, 19980027/4, Letter from Roger Romani to Édouard Balladur, 4 August 1993.
93. *JORF*, ANDP, "1re séance du 11 juin 2004," 4820.
94. Le mémorial de Rivesaltes, "L'esprit du projet," http://www.cg66.fr/52-le-memorial-de-rivesaltes.htm.
95. Agence France Presse, "Chirac: 'les massacres (de harkis) commis en 1962 doivent être reconnus,'" 25 September 2001.